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KEYNOTE ADDRESS 
BROOKSLEY BORN∗ 
I am delighted to be with you for this important Symposium on 
issues relating to regulatory enforcement.  I thought it might help to 
frame the discussion you will hear tomorrow about enforcement 
problems in the financial services area by describing the profound de-
regulatory forces that have been at work in the United States for more 
than thirty years.1  Deregulation of financial services was one of the 
major causes of the 2008 financial crisis and underlies many of the en-
forcement difficulties we are experiencing today.  Decades of deregu-
lation have seriously undercut the rule of law as applied to the finan-
cial services industry. 
My views on this issue are informed by my service as Chair of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission in the late 1990s, where I 
worked with your professor Michael Greenberger in an unsuccessful 
effort to impose much needed rules of the road on the enormous and 
dangerous over-the-counter derivatives market, a market which later 
played a significant role in the 2008 financial crisis.  My service on the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (or “FCIC”) investigating the 
causes of that crisis brought home to me the devastating impact of the 
systematic dismantling of business regulation in the financial sector.  
The FCIC concluded that failures in financial regulation and supervi-
sion along with failures of corporate governance and risk manage-
ment at major financial firms were prime causes of the financial cri-
sis.2 
In response to the Great Depression of the 1930s, this country 
put in place simple and commonsense regulations governing the fi-
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 1.  This speech was adapted from an earlier article, Brooksley Born, Foreword, Deregu-
lation: A Major Cause of the Financial Crisis, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 231 (2011). 
 2.  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at xviii–xix (2011) 
[hereinafter FCIC REPORT], available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic 
-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf. 
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nancial sector in an effort to protect the public from its excesses.  We 
adopted federal deposit insurance for commercial banks and insisted 
that in return the banks abandon dangerous and speculative activities.  
We created federal oversight of securities and derivatives markets and 
subjected professionals in those markets to regulation.  These regula-
tory actions did much to protect the economy and the public from fi-
nancial disaster for seventy years.3 
However, the lessons of the Great Depression were gradually for-
gotten.  As the report issued by the FCIC documents, decades of de-
regulation and failure to regulate newly emerging financial markets, 
firms and products led to a financial system that was extremely fragile 
and vulnerable to a full blown crisis when the U.S. housing bubble 
collapsed in 2007 and 2008.  Federal Reserve Board (“Fed”) Chair-
man Ben Bernanke told the FCIC, “Prospective subprime losses were 
clearly not large enough on their own to account for the magnitude 
of the crisis.  Rather, the system’s vulnerabilities, together with gaps in 
the government’s crisis-response toolkit, were the principal explana-
tions of why the crisis was so severe and had such devastating effects 
on the broader economy.”4 
These vulnerabilities in our financial system were the direct re-
sult of a growing belief in the self-regulating nature of financial mar-
kets and the ability of financial firms to police themselves.  Former 
Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan—a laissez-faire economist and an Ayn 
Rand disciple—championed these beliefs during his nineteen years in 
office.  With support from large financial services firms, their trade 
associations and like-minded economists, he was able to persuade pol-
icymakers in successive presidential administrations, members of 
Congress, and federal financial regulators to support deregulatory ef-
forts on the grounds that self-regulation was sufficient.5 
The financial sector devoted enormous resources to its effort to 
convince federal policymakers of the need for such deregulation.  In 
the decade leading up to the financial crisis, the sector spent $2.7 bil-
lion on federal lobbying efforts, and individuals and political action 
                                                        
 3.  See generally Michael Greenberger, Overwhelming a Financial Regulatory Black Hole 
with Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank’s Attack on Systemic Economic Destabilization Caused by an 
Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivatives Market, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 127, 129 (2011) (dis-
cussing the implementation of protective legislation, specifically the Commodities Ex-
change Act, in response to the Great Depression of the 1930s). 
 4.  FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 27 (quoting Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Gov-
ernors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Written Statement before the FCIC 2 (Sept. 2, 2010)). 
 5.  Id. at xviii. 
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committees related to the sector made more than $1 billion in federal 
election campaign contributions.6 
As a result of these pressures, significant regulatory gaps devel-
oped in the financial system, including the lightly regulated shadow 
banking system that grew to rival the traditional banking system in 
size and importance and the enormous market in over-the-counter 
derivatives.  A number of investment banks grew to be of systemic im-
portance without adequate oversight.  Institutional supervision of 
large bank holding companies, commercial banks and thrifts was 
gradually weakened, allowing them to engage in riskier activities.  
Mortgage lending standards deteriorated, and securitization of mort-
gage-related assets burgeoned with little regulatory scrutiny.  These 
developments created the conditions that caused the collapse of the 
housing bubble to turn into a major financial crisis.  As Fed Chairman 
Ben Bernanke told the FCIC, “As a scholar of the Great Depression, I 
honestly believe that September and October of 2008 was the worst 
financial crisis in global history, including the Great Depression.”7 
These deregulatory actions not only contributed significantly to 
the financial crisis but also laid the groundwork for many of today’s 
enforcement problems.  Let me describe a few examples of deregula-
tion. 
First, there was a failure to enforce needed mortgage lending 
standards.  The FCIC found that there was an explosion in risky 
mortgage lending accompanied by a significant deterioration in 
mortgage lending standards in the years leading up to the financial 
crisis, with many mortgage lenders ignoring borrowers’ ability to re-
pay their loans.  Because lenders no longer held loans for the dura-
tion of the mortgages, but instead sold them to mortgage securitizers, 
they passed on the risks of the loans and had little incentive to main-
tain high lending standards.  In addition, lenders made many preda-
tory loans designed to impose high interest payments or other terms 
increasing the yield on the loans.8 
The FCIC found that the Federal Reserve Board had the statuto-
ry authority to regulate the terms of mortgages issued by all lenders 
nationwide and to address predatory lending practices under the 
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994.9  The Fed was 
well aware of the widespread abuses in mortgage lending practices, 
                                                        
 6.  Id.  
 7.  Id. at 354 (quoting Interview by the FCIC with Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 24 (Nov. 17, 2009)). 
 8.  Id. at xvii, xxiii–xxiv, 125. 
 9.  Id. at xvii; Pub. L. No. 103–325, §§ 151–158, 108 Stat. 2160, 2190 (1994). 
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having received reports from lenders, consumer advocates, and its 
own staff, but refused to exercise its authority to rein them in.10  
Moreover, states were restricted from applying their laws prohibiting 
lending abuses to national banks and thrifts because federal supervi-
sors had pre-empted state law. 
Stemming the volume of risky mortgages might well have pre-
vented the housing bubble that triggered the financial crisis or at least 
mitigated its effects.  Current Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke told the 
FCIC that the failure to regulate the mortgage market during the 
housing boom “was the most severe failure of the Fed in this particu-
lar episode.”11 
Second, there was a failure to police mortgage securitization.  
The FCIC found that many of the risky mortgages were securitized 
and sold to investors around the world.  Indeed, between 2003 and 
2007, $4 trillion of mortgage-backed securities and $700 billion of 
mortgage-related collateralized debt obligations or CDOs were is-
sued.12  This mortgage securitization fueled the demand for risky 
mortgages and contributed significantly to the housing bubble.13 
The large financial institutions creating and selling these securi-
ties were transferring the risks of the underlying poor quality mort-
gages to their purchasers.  Those investors were lulled into a false 
sense of security because of the high credit ratings of the securities 
and the availability of credit default swap protection from large insti-
tutions such as insurance giant AIG.  When the housing bubble burst, 
many of these securities were downgraded and lost most or all of their 
value. 
The FCIC found that in a number of instances the securitizing 
firms sold the securities to investors without full and adequate disclo-
sure of the quality of the loans.14  As the FCIC report states, 
[F]irms securitizing mortgages failed to perform adequate 
due diligence on the mortgages they purchased and at times 
knowingly waived compliance with underwriting standards.  
Potential investors were not fully informed or were misled 
about the poor quality of the mortgages contained in some 
mortgage-related securities.15 
                                                        
 10.  FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 20, 93–94 
 11. Id. at 3; see also Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., Written Statement before the FCIC 27 (Sept. 2, 2010) (acknowledging that the Fed 
erred in failing to adequately supervise and regulate the mortgage market). 
 12.  FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 127–29. 
 13.  Id. at xxiii–xxiv. 
 14.  Id. at xxii, 165, 169, 187. 
 15.  Id. at 187. 
  
2013] KEYNOTE ADDRESS 1167 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), which has re-
sponsibility to ensure that adequate disclosures are made to investors, 
conducted little or no review of the disclosures on mortgage-related 
securities because of reliance on “shelf registration” provisions and 
exemptions from registration.16  Not only did the SEC fail to review 
the disclosures to investors concerning these securities, but state regu-
lators had been pre-empted from doing so and so were unable to 
combat securitization fraud.17 
Third, the over-the-counter (or “OTC”) derivatives market was 
deregulated by federal statute, and state laws governing it were pre-
empted.  The FCIC concluded that OTC derivatives contributed sig-
nificantly to the financial crisis and that the market’s deregulation by 
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 “was a key turning 
point in the march toward the financial crisis.”18  This deregulation 
was knowingly undertaken at the urging of large financial services 
firms and their regulators despite widely available information about 
the dire risks this market posed. 
After this deregulation, the OTC derivatives market experienced 
explosive growth, expanding more than seven fold in the years lead-
ing up to June 2008, when it reached over $650 trillion in notional 
amount, or more than ten times the gross domestic product of all the 
countries in the world.19  The FCIC found that this enormous deregu-
lated market was characterized by “uncontrolled leverage; lack of 
transparency, capital, and collateral requirements; speculation; inter-
connections among firms; and concentrations of risk in this market.”20 
The FCIC concluded that OTC derivatives played several major 
roles in the financial crisis.  Credit default swaps (or “CDSs”) are OTC 
derivatives contracts in which one party agrees to pay the other party 
in case of a default on an obligation such as a mortgage-related secu-
rity.  Investors in mortgage-related securities purchased CDSs from 
large OTC derivatives dealers such as AIG in order to protect them-
selves from default on the securities.  The FCIC found that the re-
assurance provided to investors by these CDSs fueled mortgage secu-
ritization and the housing bubble.21 
In addition, CDSs were used to create synthetic CDOs, which 
were not actual mortgage assets at all, but rather were merely bets on 
                                                        
 16.  Id. at 169–70, 187. 
 17.  Id. at 187. 
 18.  Id. at xxiv. 
 19.  Id. at 48. 
 20.  Id. at xxiv. 
 21.  Id. 
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mortgage securities.  These bets significantly amplified the losses from 
the collapse of the housing bubble, multiplying the amount riding on 
real mortgage securities.22 
AIG’s near failure because of its issuance of billions of dollars of 
CDSs on risky mortgage securities was one of the precipitating causes 
of the financial crisis.  When AIG was unable to meet its obligations to 
post collateral on these CDSs, the government had to rescue it, ulti-
mately committing more than $180 billion to the rescue efforts be-
cause of concerns that AIG’s collapse would trigger losses cascading 
through the financial system.23 
In addition to the role of CDSs in the financial crisis, the FCIC 
concluded that “the existence of millions of derivatives contracts of all 
types between systemically important financial institutions—unseen 
and unknown in this unregulated market—added to uncertainty and 
escalated panic, helping to precipitate government assistance to those 
institutions.”24  Because OTC derivatives contracts created intercon-
nections between firms through counterparty credit exposures, the 
failure of one large financial firm had the potential of spreading loss-
es and failures throughout the financial system.  The lack of any fed-
eral or state rules of the road for this market led to widespread abuses 
that brought the financial system to the brink of disaster. 
Fourth, there was a profound failure of federal supervision of fi-
nancial institutions.  The FCIC found that federal supervisors of bank 
holding companies and investment banks failed in their mission to 
preserve the safety and soundness of a number of systemically im-
portant financial institutions.25  These institutions either failed or 
would have failed but for government assistance during the financial 
crisis. 
Perhaps the most egregious supervisory failure related to the 
country’s largest investment banks, which for the most part were al-
lowed to grow with little or no supervision except with respect to their 
securities operations.  In April 2004, the SEC adopted the Consolidat-
ed Supervised Entity (or “CSE”) program under which the country’s 
five largest investment banks voluntarily submitted themselves for the 
first time to prudential supervision.26 
                                                        
 22.  Id. at xxiv–xxv. 
 23.  Id. at xxv. 
 24.  Id. at xxv (emphasis added). 
 25.  Id. at xviii. 
 26.  Id. at 150–54 (discussing and defining the involvement of the five largest invest-
ment banks in the CSE program). 
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Within four and a half years of the SEC’s adoption of this so-
called supervisory program, all of the five investment banks it pur-
ported to supervise had disappeared in the financial crisis: Lehman 
Brothers was bankrupt, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch had been ac-
quired under emergency circumstances by large bank holding com-
panies, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley had saved themselves 
by converting to bank holding companies supervised by the Federal 
Reserve.  The investment banks were brought to the brink of failure 
by high leverage, insufficient liquidity, large exposures to risky mort-
gage loans and mortgage-related securities, interconnections through 
OTC derivatives trades, and an undue reliance on short-term borrow-
ing in the commercial paper and repo markets.  The SEC had utterly 
failed to supervise these institutions effectively.  In terminating the 
program, then Chairman of the SEC Christopher Cox concluded that 
it had been “fundamentally flawed from the beginning.”27 
In addition, federal banking supervisors failed to rein in the risky 
activities of some of the country’s largest bank holding companies, in-
cluding Bank of America and Citigroup.  As the FCIC concluded, 
“[i]n case after case after case, regulators continued to rate the insti-
tutions they oversaw as safe and sound even in the face of mounting 
troubles, often downgrading them just before their collapse.”28 
These failures in banking supervision were another result of the 
prevailing deregulatory mindset at the Fed and other banking super-
visors.  As former director of the Fed’s Division of Banking Supervi-
sion and Regulation Richard Spillenkothen explained to the FCIC, 
“[s]upervisors understood that forceful and proactive supervision, es-
pecially early intervention before management weaknesses were re-
flected in poor financial performance, might be viewed as i) overly-
intrusive, burdensome, and heavy-handed, ii) an undesirable con-
straint on credit availability, or iii) inconsistent with the Fed’s public 
posture.”29 
Fifth, the safeguards of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which re-
stricted commercial banks’ participation in securities markets, were 
abandoned.  Bank supervision was significantly weakened as a result 
of a number of exceptions to the Glass-Steagall Act adopted by bank 
                                                        
 27.  Id. at 154 (quoting Press Release, SEC, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consoli-
dated Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2008/2008-230.htm). 
 28.  Id. at xviii. 
 29.  Id. at 54 (quoting Rich Spillenkothen, Notes on the Performance of Prudential 
Supervision in the Years Preceding the Financial Crisis by a Former Director of Banking 
Supervision and Regulation at the Federal Reserve Board (1991 to 2006), at 28, May 31, 
2010, available at http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/documents/view/1237). 
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supervisors over a period of fifteen years.  As banks experienced grow-
ing competition from investment banks and money market funds, 
they pressed their supervisors and Congress to allow them to enter in-
to new activities.  Supervisors issued rules permitting banks or their 
nonbank subsidiaries to engage in increasingly risky activities, includ-
ing securities activities and OTC derivatives dealing.30 
By 1998, many of the restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act had 
been effectively eroded, and Citicorp announced a planned merger 
with Travelers Insurance that would have violated the Act.  In re-
sponse, Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, re-
pealing most of the remaining constraints of Glass-Steagall.31  In ex-
plaining the bank supervisors’ support for this action, Eugene 
Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency from 1993 to 1998, told the 
FCIC that the supervisors had an “historic vision, historic approach, 
that a lighter hand at regulation was the appropriate way to regu-
late.”32  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act left banks as vulnerable to the 
collapse of the housing bubble as investment banks, and a number of 
large bank holding companies were brought to the brink of failure 
during the financial crisis. 
*  *  * 
The causative role of deregulation and inadequate regulation in 
the financial crisis demonstrates the fallacies of reliance on self-
regulation in a field central to the American economy and the welfare 
of the American people.  These same deregulatory forces have ham-
strung financial regulators and enforcement authorities.  During a 
period of 30 years, regulatory statutes were repealed, exemptions 
from rules were adopted or expanded, federal regulators failed to 
implement or enforce existing rules, and state law was pre-empted.  
Important new financial markets, firms, and products developed and 
grew outside the purview of laws and regulators. 
Enforcement efforts today have been significantly impaired by 
this history of deregulation.  Rebuilding a regulatory scheme de-
signed for modern financial markets is the challenge the country now 
faces.  The enactment of financial regulatory reforms in the Dodd-
Frank Act in 2010 was an important first step in doing so.33  However, 
                                                        
 30.  Id. at 34–35 
 31.  Id. at 54–55; Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). 
 32.  FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 171 (quoting Interview by the FCIC with Eugene 
Ludwig, Promontory Fin. Group (Sept. 2, 2010)). 
 33.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in various sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
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it is imperative that those reforms be fully implemented through new 
agency regulations and then rigorously enforced. 
Unfortunately, major change is difficult even under the best of 
circumstances and takes a great deal of time and effort.  The culture, 
values and attitudes of Washington policymakers, financial regulators, 
and enforcement officials must undergo a profound transformation 
to embrace the need for financial regulation.  Yet, there are strong 
forces dedicated to preventing this transformation. 
Large financial institutions and their trade associations are en-
gaged in a concerted effort to prevent full implementation and en-
forcement of the Dodd-Frank Act.  The financial crisis left some sys-
temically important institutions even larger than they were before the 
crisis through merger and consolidation in the industry, and these 
survivors are in many cases determined to preserve the lucrative busi-
ness operations that deregulation allowed them.  They are exercising 
their great political and financial powers to resist new regulation.  
Alan Greenspan has been joining the chorus by warning about dire 
consequences of some provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.34 
Republican members of Congress, who almost uniformly op-
posed adoption of the Act, are in many cases supporting these indus-
try efforts.  Bills are pending in Congress that would repeal or weaken 
the Act.  Industry and congressional efforts to persuade agencies to 
issue watered down regulations, create or broaden exemptions or 
otherwise fail to fully implement provisions of the Act are underway.  
Serious delays in implementation are occurring, and a number of law-
suits have been filed by members of the financial sector to enjoin 
rules from going into effect.  Confirmation of federal financial nomi-
nees has been stalled or delayed.  Moreover, Congressional threats to 
cut the funding of key regulators imperil regulatory reform.  For ex-
ample, the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”), the agencies with responsibility to impose needed regula-
tion on the OTC derivatives market, are threatened with cuts that 
would significantly impair their operations. 
The political power of the financial sector is still enormous, but 
our policy makers must have the political will to resist these efforts to 
derail regulatory reform.  If they do not learn from the financial crisis 
and insist on regulatory reforms addressing its causes, we all will be 
doomed to repeated financial crises.  The American people deserve 
                                                        
 34.  Alan Greenspan, Op-Ed, Dodd-Frank Fails to Meet the Test of our Times, FT.COM (Mar. 
29, 2011, 6:31 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/14662fd8-5a28-11e0-86d3-00144feab 
49a.html#axzz2XdIbSxkA. 
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better.  It is now time to re-establish the rule of law governing the fi-
nancial sector. 
Thank you. 
